The analysis of software architecture plays an important role in understanding the system structures and facilitate proper implementation of user requirements. Despite its importance in the software engineering practice, the lack of formal description and verification support in this domain hinders the development of quality architectural models. To tackle this problem, in this work, we develop an approach for modeling and verifying software architectures specified using Monterey Phoenix (MP) architecture description language. MP is capable of modeling system and environment behaviors based on event traces, as well as supporting different architecture composition operations and views. First, we formalize the syntax and operational semantics for MP; therefore, formal verification of MP models is feasible. Second, we extend MP to support shared variables and stochastic characteristics, which not only increases the expressiveness of MP, but also widens the properties MP can check, such as quantitative requirements. Third, a dedicated model checker for MP has been implemented, so that automatic verification of MP models is supported. Finally, several experiments are conducted to evaluate the applicability and efficiency of our approach
process. Software architecture specifications are thus important to guarantee that the systems are consistent with specified requirements. They have been widely used in many domains to assist users to get an intuitive understanding of the whole system and facilitate different groups to cooperate together by giving them guidelines and objectives. Due to its importance, the precise modeling of software architecture is critical, and an expressive modeling language in this domain is thus in demand.
Among the various architecture description languages, Monterey Phoenix (MP) [3] [4] [5] is a precise and innovative language which describes the system behavior based on rigorous event grammar rules. In this language, the behavior of the system is defined as a set of events (event trace) with two basic relations: precedence and inclusion. The structure of an event trace is specified using event grammar rules and other constraints organized into schemas. The structure of the system can be designed based on the behavior model, which provides a topology representation of how the system is composed and operated by users.
As an automatic approach, model checking [6, 8] plays an important role in verifying the desired properties of a specific system. However, the lack of publicly available syntax/semantics document of MP indicates that it is not clear whether the semantic model of MP is consistent with any semantic model used in model checking. Besides this drawback, there are still some other shortcomings of MP which prevent its widely usage.
-Based on event grammar rules, MP does not support shared variables, which causes the modeling with MP not so flexible; -MP only focuses on concurrent systems while stochastic behaviors exist in various systems, including software architecture.
To tackle these issues, in this work, we present an automated approach to model and verify stochastic software architecture based on MP. First, we cover a rich set of MP syntax to describe concurrent communications between the components and connectors of the system. We formally define the syntax and operational semantics to provide the foundation of formal analysis. Second, shared variables are added to MP models, which widens the application of MP by increasing the flexibility of modeling. Third, we extend MP to support probabilistic choices, which makes MP suitable for stochastic systems as well. We show that the semantic model of extended MP is Probabilistic Automata (PA) [26] , which is suitable for probabilistic model checking. PA is expressive since it supports full nondeterminism combined with probability. Based on the formal semantics, we have further developed a dedicated model checker for MP, which supports modeling, simulation and verification of MP models. Several popular properties are supported in MP verification for the first time, such as deadlock checking, reachability checking and linear temporal logic (LTL) checking. Finally, we demonstrate our approach with modeling modeling and verifying a number of examples: a client server, a pipe filter and a radar weapon system [5] are modeled by the formal language based on original MP; a keyless car system which has various variables is used to demonstrate the usage of shared variables; the Monty Hall problem [22, 23] and an unreliable channel are used to indicate the application of extended MP in stochastic systems. Through these cases, the applicability and effectiveness of our approach are evaluated.
Related work
In the past decade, model checking techniques have been applied to software architecture designs [31] , which aim at achieving precise specification and rigorous verification of the intended structures and behaviors in the design. The advantage of formal verification is to precisely determine whether a system can satisfy properties from users' requirements. Furthermore, automated verification provides an efficient method to check the correctness of the architecture design.
A considerable number of architecture description languages have been proposed in the past years, e.g., Wright [1, 2] , ACME [10] , and CHAM [9, 12] . Wright and ACME capture the design requirements and structures of systems by composing components which interact through connectors, and CHAM models system architecture in terms of molecules and transformation rules. The drawback of these existing approaches mainly lies in the limited verification support to the software architecture models specified in those notations. For example, Wright is considered as the prominent language in modeling the component and connector structures. It makes the explicit use of parameterizing the specific behaviors of a particular type. This language is partially encoded into the FDR model checker [20] , where only a subset of the language is supported, and the verification is limited by the FDR tool (e.g., only compatibility checking and deadlock analysis are available). For ACME language, it is intended to support mapping from one architecture description language to an intermediate logical formalism and then adopts an open semantic framework to reason about the model. Kim and Garlan [14] proposed the modeling and verification of architecture styles using Alloy [13] . In their approach, a few architecture styles based on ACME descriptions were translated to Alloy and verified. Although it offers a useful insight to the ability of applying Alloy in automating the verification of architecture descriptions, the performance issue is a practical limitation. The CHAM language has an effective way to express system properties but with no verification support. Compared with these work, our model checker supports more properties, such as reachability checking and LTL checking.
This guarantees a relatively comprehensive checking for the systems' dynamics. Meanwhile, our tool supports direct simulation and verification of MP models without extra translation procedure, which can save the overhead to a large extent compared with the translation approach adopted by Wright and ACME languages. Most importantly, our approach supports the modeling and verifying of stochastic systems, while the previous work just considers concurrent systems. This indicates that the extended MP has much better expressiveness compared with the work mentioned above.
In addition to the above mentioned specific architecture description languages, a considerable amount of work has involved the Z [25] specification language and the CSP [11] language. Z is a model-based, set-theoretic formalism which is developed to be highly expressive. The system described in Z notations includes a set of system states and different operations. There are also the Object-Z [24] and TCOZ [18] languages proposed to extend Z with object-oriented styles and timing primitives. In contrast, CSP is one of the process algebra languages. It defines system behaviors based on process modeling and formal reasoning about these models. The Wright language uses a subset of CSP to specify the behaviors of connected elements of a system. In particular, the concept of schemas in Z notations and the process expressions of CSP provide inspiration and insight for formalizing and refining the behavior models in MP. Furthermore, a stateof-the-art probabilistic model checker PRISM [15] is used to verify software architecture for multi-core platforms [29] . One drawback for these work is that their modeling languages are not specific to software architecture; therefore, the accuracy of modeling is hard to control. On the contrary, we focus on MP, which is designed for software architecture and thus more suitable for the modeling and analysis tasks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the background knowledge used in this paper. Section 3 introduces the language features of MP. Section 4 defines the formal syntax and operational semantics for MP, including the extension of shared variables and probabilistic choices. The implementation and evaluation of our approach is described in Sect. 5. Section 6 concludes the paper and discusses the future work.
Background
In this section, we recall some background knowledge used in this paper, which includes the modeling formalisms and formal properties used in modeling and verification of MP systems.
Probabilistic automata
When modeling probabilistic systems (particularly, discretetime stochastic control processes), PA [26] is one of the popular models since it supports full nondeterminism and probability. A PA is a directed graph whose transitions are labeled with events or probability. The following notations are used to denote different transition labels. τ denotes an unobservable event; Act denotes the set of observable events such that τ ∈ Act; Act τ denotes Act {τ }. Given a set of countable states S, a distribution is a function μ : → μ such that s ∈ S; x ∈ Act τ and μ ∈ Distr(S). If μ is trivial, i.e., ∃s ∈ S satisfying μ(s ) = 1, the transition can be further simplified as s One simple PA is demonstrated in Fig. 1 . Note a transition following a trivial distribution is labeled with an action only. In this example,
Here, μ 1 , and μ 3 are self-explanatory in Fig. 1 . μ 2 is a distribution from s 1 via action a. Note that two such distributions exist, and μ 2 satisfies μ 2 (s 4 ) = 0.4 and μ 2 (s 2 ) = 0.6.
Throughout this paper, we assume that PAs are deadlockfree following the standard practice. A deadlocking PA can be made deadlock-free by adding self-loops labeled with τ with probability 1 to the deadlocking states, without affecting the result of probabilistic verification. Fig. 2 , which is generated from the PA in Fig. 1 with a scheduler 6 ). Related distributions are defined in Fig. 1 .
The cylinder set of a finite path π of D δ is defined as Cyl(π ) = {π ∈ Paths(D δ )|π is infinite and π is a prefix of π }. The probability of the cylinder sets denoted as P δ D is given by:
Note that for an infinite path set the definition may involve an infinite sum, but it always defines a probability mass between 0 and 1.
Given a PA D, it is often useful to find out the probability of D satisfying a property φ. Note that with different schedulers, the result may be different. For instance, if φ is reachability of a state s from s init , then s may be reached by different scheduling with different probability. The measurement of interest is thus the maximum and minimum probability of satisfying φ under different schedulers. The maximum probability is defined as follows.
Note that the supremum ranges over all, potentially infinitely many, schedulers. Intuitively, it is the maximum of probability of satisfying φ with any scheduler. The minimum is defined as:
which yields the best lower bound that can be guaranteed for the probability of satisfying φ. For different classes of properties, there are different methods to calculate the maximum and minimum probability. It has been shown in [6] that memoryless schedulers are sufficient in calculating maximal and minimal probability in reachablity checking and LTL checking.
State/event linear temporal logic (SE-LTL)
In this part, we introduce a widely used temporal logic: LTL, which is also one main kind of properties studied in this paper. Traditional LTL was introduced to specify the properties of executions of a system [19] . In [7] , LTL is extended to build up from not only state propositions but also events. 2 The extended LTL is referred to as SE-LTL. Given a PA D = (S, s init , Act, Pr), an SE-LTL formula φ can be composed by not only atomic state propositions but also actions. The syntax is
p ranges over a set of propositions (formulated via predicates on shared variables in MP) and α ∈ Act. The semantics of SE-LTL is defined as follows.
. . be an infinite path in a PA D and π i the suffix of π starting at s i . The path satisfaction relation is defined as follows:
Informally, ¬φ means φ does not hold; X φ indicates φ should be true in next state; U means "until", i.e., φ 1 U φ 2 indicates that φ 1 must be true until φ 2 is true. Other properties can be extended from these basic syntax. For example, ♦ p meaning eventually p can be expressed as true U p, and p meaning "always p" can be represented as ¬♦¬ p.
LTL checking in probabilistic systems is important, and the standard method is the automata-based approach [6] , whose sketch is given as follows. Firstly, a deterministic Rabin automaton equivalent to a given LTL formula is built. The product of the automaton and the PA are then computed. Thirdly, Maximal End Components (MECs) [6] in the product which satisfy the Rabin acceptance condition are identified as target states. Lastly, the probability of reaching any state of the target states is calculated, which equals the probability of satisfying the property. The detailed algorithm can be found in [6] .
Monterey Phoenix
In this section, we introduce the basic concepts and language features of MP. The software architectures are specified based on behavior models. The behavior of a system is defined as a set of events (event trace) with two basic relations: precedence (PRECEDES) and inclusion (I N). In case of precedence, it means two events are ordered. One event should happen before the other event. In case of inclusion, it represents one event appears inside another. Under this relation, events can be defined in an appropriate level of granularity and with hierarchical structures. These two relations could define a partial order between events, and two events may happen concurrently if they are not ordered. Meanwhile, these relations are transitive, non-commutative, non-reflexive, and distributive. The fourth rule denotes a set of zero or more events satisfying event pattern B without an ordering relation between them. Similar to scope sequence rule, users can set a particular scope for this rule in the following way: " A : { * start Scope − end Scope B * };," where start Scope and end Scope are nonnegative integers. A valid scenario for this rule is shown in Fig. 6 .
This rule denotes an optional event B, i.e., B may or may be contained in A. All valid scenarios for this rule are presented in Fig. 7 .
The sixth rule denotes an alternative-event A can include event B, or event C, or event D. All valid scenarios for this rule are shown in Fig. 8 .
Events in MP are the basic elements and defined at different levels of granularity. According to the language features, we classify all events into three categories. They are root events, middle events, and leaf events, respectively. Among them, root events and middle events can be viewed as composite events defined by pattern lists; leaf events are the atomic events, which are executed at each step during the process of simulation or verification. Both middle events and leaf events can appear in the pattern lists.
The behavior model of a software system is specified using a set of event traces together with some constraints organized in a schema. M P schema is organized as a set of root events without P R EC E DE S or I N relations between them, and its concepts are inspired by Z schemas and the architectural concept of con f iguration. For a traditional con f iguration, it usually contains a collection of components and connectors, where components capture the behavior of each part of the system and connectors specify the interactions among components. In terms of MP model, both components and connectors are expressed by root events, while other events are used to specify the event structures and interactions. The detailed structure of MP schema will be introduced in Sect. 4 .
In addition to the basic grammar rules, MP also provides a mechanism for synchronizing root event behaviors through the specific share all constraint. This operation plays a role similar to the event synchronization in CSP. The following shows two examples of the share all constraint:
The events in the left side of the share all constraint should be root events only, therefore, event A, B, C are all root events. The first one means that {x : D|x I N A} = {y : D|y I N B}. The second constraint denotes that {x : D|x I N A or x I N B} = {y : D|y I N C}. We will use a Multiple Synchronized Transactions schema given in Fig. 9 to illustrate this constraint. This MP schema requires that the T ask A and T ask B components are involved in a strictly synchronized communication. Each Send event can only appear when the previous Receive event has been accomplished. A valid event trace specified by this example is shown in Fig. 10 in the case for scope 2.
Formal syntax and semantics of MP
After introducing the basic concepts of MP, we are ready to present the formal syntax and operational semantics in this part. As introduced in Sect. 2, system behaviors in MP are described based on behavior models. Different event traces 
Syntax of MP schema
The syntax of MP schema is formalized in this subsection. We start with the formalization of the M P Schema definition as follows.
Definition 4 (MP Schema) MP Schema is a 4-tuple S = (V ar, I nit, P, C)
, where V ar is a set of shared variables; I nit is the initial valuation of the variables; P denotes all the pattern lists of root events; C is the share all constraint.
In the above Schema, multiple root events can have several leaf events in common. The common leaf events are provided by share all constraint. All the root events should execute their common leaf events simultaneously. Other events are executed in interleaving.
In MP, the behavioral aspects of the root events or middle events are described through pattern list which is the key part of this language. Next, we show the syntax of pattern list in Fig. 11 . Most of the syntax is derived from the event grammar rules given in Sect. 3.
In Fig. 11 , e l denotes the leaf event which is atomic; e m denotes middle event; b is a boolean expression; the capital letters P and Q represent pattern lists. In addition, we need to define the scope for the scope set and iterative pattern lists in order to make the event trace finite when doing model checking. Therefore, a 1 and a 2 are two nonnegative integers that define the lower bound and upper bound of the scope. Meanwhile, no explicit or implicit recursion of middle event definition is allowed in our setting to guarantee the finite events on a sequence.
A leaf event e l is executed individually. e l { pr og} executes leaf event e l and a sequential program pr og at the same time and shared variables engaged in pr og can be updated accordingly. Event Ski p is a special leaf event, representing a successful termination event. This event means a pattern list finishes successfully without deadlock. denotes an empty event which performs no action. P Q is the sequence pattern. It behaves as pattern list P first until its termination and then behaves as pattern list Q. The alternative pattern (P 1 |P 2 |....|P n ) is made internally and non-deterministically where any P i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) may execute subsequently.The set pattern {P 1 , P 2 , ..., P n } denotes interleaving execution where any P i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) may perform their local actions without referring to each other. The scope set { * a 1 − a 2 P * } defines several same pattern list P execution without P R EC E DE S order. In contrast, iterative pattern ( * a 1 − a 2 P * ) defines several pattern list P execution in P R EC E DE S order, where each P must perform when the previous one has been finished. The number of pattern list P must fall in the predefined scope in both iterative patterns.
The W hen structure is similar to the interrupt operation in CSP or the exception handling construct in imperative programming languages such as C# and JAVA. The execution of P can be interrupted by pattern list Q i , and the system behaves as Q i afterward. If Q i is attached with R E ST ART , after its interruption, the system will behaves as Q i first. When Q i terminates, it goes back to the pattern list before the interruption happens.
The [b]P means when boolean expression b is true, P can be executed; otherwise, the system is blocked. The i f b {P} else {Q} is a conditional branching. When the b is evaluated to be true, the system performs P, else performs Q. All the variables in expression b are shared variables. Similarly, the while loop while b {P} behaves continuously as Lastly, similar to the work [28] , probabilistic choice is written in the form of pcase ( pr 0 : P 0 | pr 1 :
where pr i is a positive integer to express the probability weight. Intuitively, it means that with pr i pr 0 + pr 1 +···+ pr k probability, the system behaves as P i . After introducing the formal syntax, we present four MP schemas to illustrate the syntax more clearly. Two concurrent systems based on the original MP are used: the Client Server schema in Fig. 12 and the Pi pe Filter schema in Fig. 13 . The third and fourth one are two probabilistic systems with shared variables: the Mont y Hall schema in Fig. 14 and U nreliable Channel schema in Fig. 15 .
In the Client Server schema, the size of the scope sets is 2. The Client can request information from the Server and then block itself to wait for the reply. When the Server receives requests, it will process them and send back the results to Client. After receiving the results, the Client will unblock itself and continue executing. The Connector is used to restrict the order of event between Client and Server . This structure is quite commonly used in nowadays applications such as the Browser/Server structure.
The second one is the Pi pe Filter schema which models a system whose execution is driven by data flow. The size of the scope sets is 4. There are two Filter components and one Pi pe component in this system. Both Filters can receive data, process data and send out data. The Pi pe is responsible for transmitting data from one Filter to another and keep the data flow direction. The Connector here is restricting the order of event, where the Filter_One sending out data must be performed before the Pi pe getting data in, and the Filter_T wo receives data only after the data is sent out from the Pi pe. This structure is also popular in many industrial examples, such as the data flow applications, map-reduce model in cloud computing and Yahoo! Pipes.
The third one is the Mont y Hall problem, which describes a probabilistic puzzle. First, several shared variables are declared, such as car and guess, which are used to record the position of the car and the choice of the guest. According to the different behaviors of the host and the guest, several root events can be defined. Generally, there are several components of this problem. There are three doors closed. First, a car as a prize will be non-deterministically put behind one door. Next, the player will pick one door as his choice. Obviously, the probability of choosing a specific door should be 1 3 . Afterward, the host opens one of the remaining two doors which has no price. Then, he will ask the guest "would you like to switch your choice to the other remaining door?" According to whether the guest switches his choice, the probabilities for him to win the prize are different.
Several root events are defined to capture different behaviors of the host and the guest. Sys_T ake_O f f er indicates the guest switches his choice after the host opens one door; Sys_N ot_T ake_O f f er means the guest keeps his decision by refusing the host's offer; Sys_W ith_Dishonest_ Program describes the scenario that the host places the car behind one door after the guest makes a choice; in another two scenarios, the host has some probability to cheat the guest by switching the car to the guest's chosen door and then asks whether the guest wants to change his choice. Sys_W ith_Cheating_Host_Switch and Sys_W ith_Cheating_Host_N ot_Switch are used to model the guest will/will not change his choice when host cheating happens.
The fourth one is the U nreliable Channel protocol, which captures the scenario that component A asks for data from component B via an unreliable channel. Here, the channel may fail to send the message because of the unpredictable environment, and the probability it succeeds can be obtained by statistical investigation. Besides the stochastic behaviors of the channel, B also has some probability to fail to work, which makes the communication fail. In Fig. 15 , we assume A tries to communicate with B for ten times, which is captured by the size of the scope sets. Two variables are used to record the number of missing messages and whether the communication finishes. A's behavior is captured by RO OT T ask A, and it first sends request to B, and later receives data from B or waits until timeout happens in this round of communication. In this example, we assume B has 10 % chance to fail to response, which is captured by the pcase in T ask B_detail. When this happens, messageMissing will by increased by 1. Otherwise, B will successfully receive the request from A and send back the response. For the connector between A and B, we assume that it has 1 % chance to ignore A's message, which is captured by by pcase in Connector_ A_to_B_detail. Lastly, multiple share all rules are applied to regulate the behaviors of A, B and the channel (connector).
Operational semantics
In this part, we present the operational semantics of MP, which translates an MP models into its semantic model: PA. Afterward, the PA is checked to analyze the dynamics of the original MP system. The sets of behaviors can be extracted from the operational semantics accordingly. We start with the definition of system configuration. It captures the global system state during system executions.
Definition 5 (Configuration) A system con f iguration is composed of two components (V, P),
where V is the current valuation of all shared variables, and P is the current pattern list expression.
The operational semantics for pattern list is presented as firing rules associated with each pattern list construct. For simplicity, a function upd(V, pr og), to which given a sequential pr ogram and valuation V , returns the modified valuation function V according to the semantics of the program. We write V b (or V b) to denote that condition b evaluates to be true (or false) given V . The firing rules are defined as follows.
(V, e l )
e l → (V, ) [event] (V, e l { pr og}) e l → (upd(V, pr og), ) [ program] In event rule, the model behaves as a leaf event e l . A leaf event is performed in one step during the process of simulation or verification. The pr ogram rule is defined for the special event which is a paragraph of sequential program. The system will update the values of shared variables according to the semantics of the program in this rule.
(V, Ski p) → (V, )
[terminate]
The terminate rule describes the behavior of Ski p. It executes a special leaf event representing termination and then becomes .
The alternative rule is a multiple choice rule. The system can choose any patternlist P i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) to execute subsequently.
Rules sequence 1 and sequence 2 , the system executes pattern list P first. When P is found to be finished, the model will continue to execute pattern list Q.
Rules share 1 , share 2 and share 3 define the behavior of the root pattern lists under the share all constraint. The shared leaf events should be executed simultaneously. For other unshared events, they are performed without specific order. Assuming that we have two pattern list: P and Q, and E represents shared events between them. If e l is not in E, it can be executed by one pattern without affecting the other, captured by rules share 1 and share 2 . Otherwise, e l should be executed simultaneously in both P and Q as shown in rule share 3 . Note in share 3 , variables cannot be updated via e l in case confliction happens during updates of both P and Q.
Rules when 1 and when 2 denote a root pattern list which can be interrupted by multiple pattern lists. When the system executes the when rules, the first event of pattern list Q i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) may be inserted in the event trace at any place within the root trace; then, the trace is continued with events specified by pattern list Q i .
For restart rule, users can choose to put a R E ST ART clause after the interruption pattern list Q i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). It defines that the event trace can restart from the beginning of the root pattern list after the interruption.
Rules iterative 1 and iterative 2 describe a scope sequence operation which implies the pattern list P can happen sequentially for a number of times. Integer a is randomly chosen between a 1 and a 2 in order to specify the number of iteration times. If the value of a is chosen to be 0, the system has no behavior. Otherwise, it will behave as rule iterative 1 .
[set]
The set rule denotes a set of various pattern lists execute concurrently without an ordering relation between them. The pattern lists in set are executed without P R EC E DE S order.
The re f rule denotes that if M is a reference of P, i.e., M is an alias of P, then M has the same executions as P.
Rules scope 1 and scope 2 denote a number of pattern list P execute concurrently without P R EC E DE S order. Rules scope 1 and scope 2 are defined according to the value of a.
Rules condition 1 and condition 2 define how to execute the conditional choice. If expression b is evaluated to be true, the pattern list P is executed, otherwise pattern list Q is executed. 
Rules while 1 and while 2 define how the while loop works. If the value of expression b is true, the model behaves continuously as pattern list P. Otherwise, the loop will terminate.
Rule pb defines the semantics of pcase. It states that if pcase is activated, then it transmits to a distribution μ via action τ . The probability of reaching the successive states follows the probability weight. Note the valuation of variables keeps unchanged. Following the firing rules, the MP Schema is translated into PA to perform simulation and verification. Next, we use Monty Hall problem to illustrate the construction of its corresponding PA. We choose the PA representing root event Sys_N ot_T ake_O f f er, part of which is demonstrated in Fig. 16 .
In Fig. 16 , the self-loops of deadlock states are ignored for simplicity. In s init , middle event PlaceCar is enabled. Applying rule alternative, there should be three outgoing transitions from s init . For simplicity, we just choose one of them for demonstration in Fig. 16 , which is labeled placecar.1. The other two cases can be similarly obtained. In s 1 , car = 1 since the car is placed behind door 1. Now middle event Guest is enabled, which has pcase constructor. Applying rule pb1, a distribution from s 1 is generated, labeled by τ . Each transition from this distribution represents one possible choice of the guest. Assume the guest wants to choose door 3, then we have the transition from s 1 to s 2 labeled with is generated. Afterward, Goat is enabled, which has nondeterministic choices. Rule alternative is applied again. However, there is one outgoing transition of s 5 , because only one of the guard conditions of the three alternatives is true. Therefore, we have the transition from s 5 to s 6 labeled with hostopen.2. Next, middle event N ot T akeO f f er is enabled, and rule pr ogram is applied again, which generates the transition from s 6 to s 7 labeled with keepguess. Other transitions in the PA can be similarly obtained using the firing rules.
Verification algorithms
Following the operational semantics, the verification of MP schemas is now based on corresponding PA. In this part, we introduce the related verification algorithms used in our model checker.
In general, reachability checking and LTL checking are widely used to analyze the dynamics of stochastic systems represented by PA. As we mentioned in Sect. 2.3, LTL checking can be reduced to reachability checking via automatabased approach [6] . Therefore, reachability checking plays a key role in PA verification, which is used to decide the probability of reaching certain disastrous states from the initial state. As a result, we mainly focus on the reachability checking algorithm used in our tool.
Given a PA, its target states are usually defined by satisfying desired propositions. After deciding the target states, each state in the PA can be represented by a variable, which indicates the probability of reaching the target states from this state. One simple example is given in Fig. 17 , where the PA is the one in Fig. 1 . Given the PA on the left and assume s 4 is the target state, we consider the maximal probability from s 0 to s 4 , and the minimal probability can be similarly calculated. We set p i to represent the maximal probability from s i to s 4 , and obviously, p 4 should be 1. A linear program can be obtained via the transition relation of the PA. For instance, there are two outgoing dis- tributions from s 1 ; therefore, p 1 should be the larger value between the results generated by these two distributions, i.e., p 1 = max{0.6 × p 2 + 0.4 × p 4 , p 3 }. Two inequations with p 1 on the left are thus obtained in the linear program.
Next, there are mainly two approaches to solve the linear program. One is solving it directly via standard approach such as simplex algorithm [21] . To adopt this method, an additional condition should be combined with the existing inequations: We must guarantee that i∈ [0, 4] p i is minimal, whose proof can be found in [6] . Although this approach is straightforward to understand and it guarantees the accurate result, its scalability is relatively poor. Since we need one variable for each state in the system, a huge number of variables are needed for large-scale systems, which may be beyond the capacity of state-of-the-art linear solvers. As a result, another approach using value iteration is more popular in probabilistic model checkers such as PRISM. Starting from the target states, this approach tries to find fix-points iteratively using backward search. We use the example in Fig. 17 to show how it works.
Assume p k i is an approximation of p i after the k-th iteration. Starting from the target state s 4 , in k-th iteration, we update the probability of states which could reach s 4 in exactly k steps. Obviously, ∀i ∈ [0, 3], p 0 i = 0. As p k 4 = 1 for any k, k is ignored in s 4 . In the first iteration, p 0 , p 1 and p 2 can be updated, and
In the second iteration, p 0 , p 1 and p 3 are updated since they can reach s 4 in two steps. It is trivial to show
.36. Afterward, p 0 , p 1 and p 3 are updated again and again. Iteratively, p i in the long run can be calculated. A user-defined threshold is usually necessary to terminate the calculation, according to the desired precision. The result of p i will be approximated gradually.
Because the value iteration approach has better scalability than solving linear program directly, we also use it in our implementation.
Implementation and evaluation
In this section, we introduce the implementation of our MP model checker. In addition, a bundle of experiments are conducted to show the effectiveness and efficiency of our approach.
Implementation
We have implemented a model checker to support system modeling and automatic verification of systems based on MP. This tool is developed in Visual Studio 2010 via C# langauge, and it has been integrated into the PAT model checking framework [16, 17, 27] as an independent module. PAT is a self-contained environment for system modeling, simulation and verification and can be freely downloaded at http:// www.patroot.com. Now, users can use the editor of our MP model checker to build their own MP models, and then, the dynamics of their system can be analyzed by the simulator and verifier for MP.
A discrete-event simulator is supported in our tool which allows users to interactively and visually simulate system behaviors. In simulation, MP models follow the operational semantics in order to guarantee that each step reflects a meaningful execution of the system. Users could choose automatic simulation, which means the simulator will randomly execute the model and generate the random states, or manual simulation, which allows users to choose the next event from the current enabled events. Through simulation, users could visually check how the model executes step by step, which is very useful in system design and analysis, especially when there are some undesired executions found in verification. Simulation is a good complement to verification since users could have an intuitive observation and it makes debugging more convenient.
Compared with simulation, automatic verification plays a more important role in system analysis since it indicates the accurate result of whether a property is satisfied in a system. As we mentioned previously, several widely used properties in probabilistic systems are supported, such as deadlock checking, reachability checking and LTL checking. The expressiveness of these properties guarantees many requirements can be covered by our model checker.
Evaluation
In order to indicate effectiveness and efficiency of our approach, six MP models are used in our experiments. Besides the Client Server System (CSS), Pipe Filter System (PFS), Monty Hall Problem (MHP) and Unreliable Channel (UC) introduced previously, we choose another two cases, which are introduced as follows.
The Radar Weapon System (RWS) is a defense system which has five components: Generator, Radar, Weapon, Control and Enemy Missile. The Generator is in charge of supplying power for Radar and Weapon when both of them are deployed. The Radar is responsible for detecting the Enemy missile. If the enemy is detected, it will activate the Weapon. When the Weapon attacks the enemy, it can either hit or miss it. The Control subsystem is used to coordinate the behaviors of Generator and Radar. The Radar must start working only after the Generator is launched. The environment is represented by Enemy Missile which may either approach or hit any of Generator, Radar or Weapon. If the Generator is hit, the consequence is causing termination of energy production or consumption correspondingly. If the Radar and Weapon are hit, they can be repaired and resume work afterward.
The Keyless Car System (KCS) describes the latest automobile technique which allows users to start their cars' engine without the hassle of key insertion and offers great convenience. Owners with key-fob in their pockets can unlock the door when they are very near the car. The drivers can slide behind the wheel with the key-fob in their pocket (briefcase or purse or anywhere inside the car). What is more, they can push the start/stop button on the control panel. Shutting off the engine is just as hassle-free and is accomplished by merely pressing the start/stop button.
According to the characteristics of these systems, we separate them into three groups to better investigate our approach. CSS, PFS and RWS are grouped together because they are all concurrent systems without probability, and they can be modeled using syntax based on original MP; KCS is a concurrent system without probability, but various variables are used in this system; lastly, MHP and UC are investigated as systems combining probability and non-determinism. Note that examples other than MHP and UC do not have stochastic behaviors. Therefore, the property checking in these systems follows the traditional model checking approach instead of probabilistic method. In other words, a property will be checked as true or false in these systems. If the answer is false, a counterexample will be generated. The test bed of all experiments is a desktop with Intel Core 2 Quad 9550 CPU at 2.83 GHz and 3 GB memory.
CSS, PFS and RWS
First, in order to compare with other tools, we model the CSS and PFS both in PAT and Alloy [13] . In CSS, one interesting property is that each request performed by the client will be responded by the server eventually, which can be specified as an LTL formula as follows.
For PFS, one interesting property is that any data received by one filter will be transferred to and dispatched by another filter eventually, whose LTL formula is as follows. Table 1 shows the experiment results and symbol '-' denotes out of memory. The number of states and transitions is acquired in PAT. The experiments are done in different scopes. From the table, we can see PAT performs better than Alloy in most cases. This is because the operational semantics are directly implemented in PAT without extra translations. Therefore, models can be precisely constructed through MP schemas. Furthermore, PAT adopts explicit model checking which can handle 10 9 number of states in hours. On the contrary, Alloy uses SAT solvers as the verification engine, which performs relatively poor due to the complexity of these systems.
In RWS system, if the Generator is hit by the Enemy Missile, the deployed Radar and Weapon will get in the critical state of missing the power supply. If the system is in the critical state, the Radar and Weapon should stop working in a real world situation. Therefore, we want to guarantee that after the system entering critical state, the Radar and Weapon cannot be launched anymore. In order to check the designed system, we express the above properties in LTL formulaes as follows:
φ 3 means whenever the Generator is hit, the Weapon will not be launched eventually. Similarly, φ 4 means whenever the Generator is hit, the Radar can not be launched eventually. We verify these two properties in MP model checker. The verification results reveal that φ 3 is valid, and the corresponding data is listed in Table 2 . Here, we do not compare with Alloy because the state space is huge and Alloy is unworkable in these cases. However, φ 4 is not satisfied by RWS. In this case, the verification data of the second property is not important and not listed in Table 2 since the state space is not fully explored. On the contrary, the counterexample information is critical. One counterexample is displayed as follows:
From the trace of the counterexample, we can see that after being hit, the Generator can be repaired and restart work. Therefore, the Radar can be launched after the Generator is hit, whereas the W eapon_On event is simultaneously synchronized by the Radar, Weapon and Enemy Missile. Even if the Radar is launched, the Weapon still cannot be triggered after the Generator is hit. We can modify the system schema by removing the Repair event and the R E ST ART clause from the Generator root event to make the properties of the system desirable. The modification means that the Generator cannot be repaired after it is hit by Enemy Missile.
KCS
Next, we analyze the dynamics of KCS using our model checker. Considering the intelligent characteristic of KCS, there are several interesting properties we want to check, which are listed as follows. Except the first property, all properties can be specified as reachability problem via defining the target variable values.
The verification results are listed in Table 3 . From the results, we can see that KCS is deadlock-free; therefore, the deadlock checking should explore all states in the system, and 4.15 s is the time for traversing all state space. Properties (2), (3) and (5) are invalid, which means no such target states exist in the system. To obtain this conclusion, all states should be visited, and this is the reason that these verifications cost the similar time of deadlock checking. Properties (4) and (6) are valid, which indicates that some target states of these properties exist; therefore, witness traces of reaching target can be given to analyze the system behaviors. Note valid properties cost much less time, because there is no need to visit whole state space as long as a target state is encountered.
MHP and UC
In MHP, the most critical question is the probability that the guest can win the car as prize. Five different scenarios (defined in Fig. 14) are checked to identify the affects of host and guest behaviors to the result. Both maximal and minimal probabilities of winning the prize are calculated, and the data are listed in Table 4 . Note all verifications end instantaneous, therefore, the time consumed is ignored. From the data, we can see that in the original scenario, and it is better for the guest to change his choice, because the probability of winning could be doubled. If the car is placed after the guest makes a choice and insists it, the maximal probability of winning should be 1 when the host deliberately puts the car behind the door chosen by the guest. Otherwise, the probability of winning is 0, which is also the minimal probability. In the last two scenarios, after the guest chooses one door, the host has some probability to switch the car to the door chosen by the guest. In this case, it is better for the guest to insist his choice, because this gives him more than 50 % chance to win the prize.
As for UC, we are interested in the outcomes of A communicates with B through the unreliable channel. Specifically, three properties are checked to show the performance of the UC system. 1. What is probability that the whole signal transmission is successful? 2. What is probability that at most one signal will be missed? 3. What should be the max probabilities of channel failures to ensure that the probability of the whole transmission is at least 90 %?
To answer these questions, reachability checking is used again. For property 1, the target is messageMissing is still 0 when end is true. Therefore, it is adequate to check the probability that the target can be reached by the system. Similarly, property 2 requires messageMissing ≤ 1 when end is true. For the third property, currently, we manually adjust the failure probability of the channel to check when the probability of the whole transmission is 0.9. We remark that the verification of this kind of property could be automated by applying some techniques for optimum search in continuous domains, and this is our future work. In experiments, we assume the failure probability of component B is always 10 %, as shown in Fig. 15 .
The experimental results of the first two properties are listed in Table 5 . C f means the failure probability of the channel. Different rounds of message transmissions are taken into consideration. Two numbers in one cell means the answer of the first two properties. For instance, the probability that 10 rounds transmission will succeed when C f = 1 % is 90.4 %. In 15 rounds transmission, where C f = 2 %, the probability that at most one message is missed is 96.5 %. For the third property, we manually adjust the probability of connector's failure, and the results are listed in Table 6 . For instance, when 10 rounds of message transmissions occur and B has 10 % probability to fail, the maximal failure probability of the connecter is 1.05 % in order to guarantee that the whole transmission succeeds with probability more that 90 %.
Conclusions and future work
The main contributions of our work are twofold. First, the formal syntax and semantics of MP architecture specification is defined, with the extension of shared variables and probabilistic choices. Therefore, both concurrent and stochastic systems can be modeled by MP now due to its expressiveness. Second, unlike many modeling languages which lack the verification tools, we design and implement a dedicated model checker for MP in the PAT framework. Therefore, the analysis of the MP models can be fulfilled effectively. In the experiments, systems from defense, automobile and communication channels are studied, and we can conclude that our MP model checker is both efficient and scalable in verifying such system architectures.
In the future, we plan to extend MP with real-time characteristics to capture the quantitative time of different components in a software system. We will also develop a Graphic User Interface (GUI) to assist the visual design of the software architectures in MP model checker. The GUI should provide diagram representations of the architecture models as well as support the definitions of the formal specifications. In addition, we can further our work via designing an architecture style library which embodies a set of commonly used architecture styles to facilitate the modeling process. Some hot architecture styles such as cloud computing and serviceoriented architectures can be included. 
